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ABSTRACT
Consider migration to a higher income region as a human capital investment in which parents bear
migration costs and children share returns.  Migrants from a population with heterogeneous intergenerational
discount rates will be self-selected on intergenerational altruism. Thus, immigrants may be self-selected on
fertility. Soviet Jews who migrate to Israel despite high migration costs have significantly more children than
members of the same birth cohort who migrate later when costs are low. We distinguish selection from
treatment effects using a comparison group of women who migrate after childbearing age. We also find that
immigrants favor bequests more and spend more time with their grandchildren in the U.S. Health and
Retirement Survey.  Selection on altruism can explain why historically immigrant-absorbing countries like
the U.S. have higher fertility than other countries at comparable income levels. It provides an alternative
explanation for Chiswick's classic earnings-overtaking result. Selection on altruism also implies that
immigrant-absorbing regions will grow faster, or have higher per capita income, or both. 
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http://econ.bu.edu/eli1 Andorka (1986) surveys the literature on declining European fertility.
2 Tcha (1996) argues that altruism towards children explains why general wages in the destination
region of internal migrants are more highly correlated with migration flow than occupation-specific wages
of the migrant. Mincer (1978) analyzes the role of altruism towards spouses in internal migration decisions.
3 That finding has spawned some debate about the role of omitted country of origin and cohort
effect on apparent overtaking. See Borjas (1987) and Lalonde and Topel (1991).
4 The total fertility rate is the sum of current age-specific birthrates across all ages. Here and
throughout this paper we use the term fertility to refer to bearing of children who survive their first few
months of life. Infant mortality rates in the Soviet Union and Israel in this period are low.
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I. Introduction
The recent transition of much of the OECD to negative population growth raises
interesting questions about fertility in the developed world.
1 Many middle and high income
countries display persistent differences in fertility unexplained by differences in per capita income
or by women's labor force participation.  Are these due to persistent differences in preferences and
norms or a response to local economic and social conditions? How much can local conditions
influence intimate decisions like family size? The apparent assimilation of local fertility rates by
immigrants (Blau, 1992) provides apparent evidence that they do. Yet assimilation is hard to
distinguish from self-selection. An alternative explanation for apparent assimilation is
congregation of similar types to the same countries.
In this paper we pursue an economic theory of self-selection on fertility, based on
Becker’s (1981) notion of intergenerational altruism. We view  migration as a human capital
investment in which the welfare of descendants is a critical concern. In the face of high migration
costs and returns that are disproportionately realized by descendants, intergenerationally altruistic
families are more likely to migrate. The importance of intergenerational altruism in migration
decisions has appeared in the work of Borjas (1993) and Tcha (1996).
2 Our innovation is to
observe that immigrant families self-selected on altruism are likely to either have more children, or
to have higher quality children (depending on relative prices). Thus, self-selection of immigrants
on fertility is suggested by theory. Selection on altruism could also explain Chiswick’s (1978)
classic finding that the earnings of immigrants eventually exceeding those of natives,
3 but we will
concentrate on the implications for fertility.
Figure 1 illustrates the fertility of countries at different income levels, graphing total
fertility rates
4 against 1992 per capita income for a sample of countries with GDP per capita
above $2000. The line illustrates the well-known negative correlation of income and fertility,
fitted here as a linear regression of the logarithm of fertility on the logarithm of per capita GDP.
The negative time series correlation for individual countries, the “fertility transition” is also well
established. With the exception of Sweden and Ireland all the European countries in this sample
and Japan are below replacement levels of total fertility while the U.S. (at TFR=2.1) is above. If
these differences persist, they imply strong divergence in population. 5 Many European countries currently have higher proportions of foreign born among residents than
do countries in the Western hemisphere. The migration costs incurred to the Western hemisphere were
probably larger, both in direct costs and in the loss of country specific human capital such as language.
6 Other aspects of this migration have attracted the attention of labor economists. The remarkably
successful integration of the huge recent influx of (formerly) Soviet immigrants into the Israeli labor market
is the subject of studies by Flug and Kasir (1993), Eckstein and Weiss (1998), Friedberg (1997), Weiss
and Gotlibovski (1995). The roles of language acquisition and education in the economic assimilation of
previous waves of migration has been studied by Chiswick (1993) and Friedberg (2000), respectively.
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Two categories of countries are disproportionately above the fertility transition line. The
first are  predominantly Muslim countries. The economics of pronatalism in radical Islam is
discussed elsewhere (Berman 2000). The second category are countries historically populated
almost entirely by voluntary migration over the last few centuries: the Western Hemisphere,
Australia and Israel.
5  That positive correlation between historical immigrant-absorption and
fertility motivates the rest of this paper. 
Is that positive correlation due to the effect of living in a particular place, or to selection?
Migration between countries with differing fertility rates can provide information about selection.
Immigrants from low income, high fertility countries to the United States who arrive as young
women have fertility rates very similar to those of American women (Blau, 1992). This is often
interpreted as assimilation. Yet they also have observable characteristics that predict negative
selection on fertility such as high education and income, when compared with women who remain
in their country of birth.
In studying self-selection Jewish immigrants to Israel from Eastern Europe are interesting
for three reasons.
6 First, they come from countries with unusually low fertility, considering their
relatively low income per capita, as shown in Figure 1. Second, Soviet Jewish women have high
rates of educational attainment. This may reduce the possibility for positive self-selection of
migrants on education, which would imply negative selection on fertility that apparently occurred
in previous studies. Third, and most important, they provide large samples of immigrants from
waves of migration by the same birth cohorts, but at different migration costs. The first wave
migrated at very high and uncertain costs in the 70s and early 80s, while the second wave
exploited a surprise opportunity to migrate at relatively low cost from 1989 onwards. This allows
us to test a key implication of our model, that selection on intergenerational altruism increases
when migration costs are high (so that the net present value of the migration investment is low).
In the Figure Israel is a positive outlier, with high fertility (2.8 lifetime births per woman)
for its income. Friedlander and Feldmann (1993) point out that among Israeli Jews this high
fertility rate is due mainly to the fertility of the Orthodox and Ultra-Orthodox communities, who
average 4.5 and 7 births per woman respectively. Israel’s secular Jewish majority averages about
2.1 births per woman, like the U.S.
We find that women immigrating from Eastern Europe to Israel differ from immigrants to
the U.S. in the literature in three important ways: First, their fertility increases as they move from
a low to a high-fertility country. Second, earlier waves of Eastern European immigrants do much7 The aggregate USSR TFR dropped in the mid 1990s to 1.5, but was stable at 1.7 during the
1980s. The drop was due to reduced fertility of cohorts younger than those we report on.
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better than “assimilating” the local fertility rate. They eventually “overtake” the natives in fertility,
averaging 2.5 children per woman, as opposed to 2.1 (for secular Jewish women), just as
Chiswick’s immigrants to the U.S. overtake the natives in earnings. Third, in the recent wave of
immigrants we observe the fertility of those women left behind. Consider two arrival cohorts, both
born around 1950. Those who arrived in the 1970s and 1980s, spending some fertile years in
Israel, had 2.5 children by the 1990s. Women from the same birth cohort who arrived in the
1990s, after spending their fertile years abroad, have 1.7 lifetime children (which is close the
USSR urban TFR of 1.7.
7)
Can we interpret this 0.8 child difference in fertility between arrival cohorts as the effect of
moving to a Western economy? Such an effect is plausible, since housing is less cramped and
basic household goods are supplied reliably at lower prices. If so, that migration effect on fertility
could imply a large baby boom in former communist countries when their economic transition is
finally completed. The same prediction may apply to emigrants from those countries. Thus, the
distinction between treatment and selection effects in the fertility of migrants is important.
We use as a comparison group women who migrate early (during the high cost period)
who are too old to experience a treatment effect. They allow us to separately identify treatment
and selection effects. That method reveals that the 0.8 child difference in fertility is mostly due to
self-selection. 
To validate that estimate we develop an alternative estimation method which separately
identifies treatment and selection effects by imposing a functional form on years since migration
and “fertile” years since migration. This second method allows us to gain precision by using more
data and to gain accuracy by using more controls. The literature has stressed the importance of
country of birth in measuring selection effects in wages (Borjas 1987, 1994; Friedberg 2000). This
method allows us to control for both country of birth and birth cohort effects. Like the first
approach, it also yields large estimated selection effects.
Evidence for positive self selection of migrants in fertility is consistent with
intergenerational altruism playing an important role in migration decisions. Selection on altruism
implies, in turn, that immigrant-absorbing countries will tend to behave like doting parents,
investing more in the welfare of their children either through faster accumulation of human and
physical capital, or through higher fertility, or both. That mechanism suggests permanent
differences in population growth or per-capita income, or both, between the immigrant absorbing
regions and other regions.
To distinguish selection on altruism from other reasons for selection on fertility we
examine other testable implications of the model, finding in the U.S. Health and Retirement
Survey that immigrants are significantly more likely to: a) believe that bequests are important and
b) spend time with their grandchildren. Those effects are robust to the inclusion of controls for the
shadow value of time and other socioeconomic characteristics.8 See Altonji et al (1992) for a caveat on the importance of intergenerational altruism in families.
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Section II presents a theory linking migration and altruism, which is a straightforward
extension of Becker (1981). Section III describes waves of Soviet migration to Israel. In section
IV we present estimates of selection and treatment effects on fertility for Soviet immigrants to
Israel.  Section V examines evidence on the altruism of immigrants. Section VI concludes.
II. Self-selection of Immigrants on Altruism and Fertility
Migration is at least partially an investment in human capital.  Even the wealthiest
immigrants can hardly ignore the economic aspects of a migration decision for themselves and
their children. Migration is expensive and expensive to reverse, especially for immigrants from
Eastern Europe before 1989.  Thus the appropriate investment horizon is intergenerational.
To illustrate how altruism links fertility and migration, consider the following two-period
maximization problem for a family of potential immigrants. Two parents have an intergenerational
utility function in the tradition of Becker (1981), Razin and Ben-Zion (1975) and Becker and
Barro (1988)
8
U = 2v(c0) + ’(n+2)v(c1) ,
where the couple has n children. The parents consume c0 each in period 0. They and the children
consume c1 each in period 1. The function v(.) is assumed to be concave. Here ’ represents both
intergenerational altruism and a discount factor for future utility but we call it altruism as that
resonates well with our theme.
The couple can intertemporally save by investing in migration, m, or by having children at
cost  k per child. Investment cost m includes all pecuniary and nonpecuniary costs of migration,
including language acquisition and loss of country specific human capital.  The migration
investment has a return r for both parents and children, all of whom will realize a higher wage in
the destination country. Parents work in the first period at wage w0 and all family members work
in the second period at wage w1, yielding consumption as a function of the migration and fertility
decisions
c0 = w0 - kn - m ,
c1 = w1(1+rm) ,
where we restrict both migration investment m and the number of children n to be nonnegative.
For simplicity, we rule out migration or other investments by children. Though migration is a
discrete choice we treat it as continuous to illustrate the nature of the solution. (Alternatively, we
could imagine a continuum of places to migrate to, with a linear envelope of costs and returns.)  
Maximizing utility by choice of number of children,  n,  and investment in migration, m, 
yields the first order conditions: 
2kv’(c0) = ’ v(c1)9 We assume that spouses share the same ’ . Mating of likes seems plausible here, since co-
ordinated consumption within a couple argues for agreement on savings decisions.
10 See Appendix for a proof. The second derivatives Un’ and Um’ are positive but the cross-partial
Unm = 2kv”(c0) + ’w1rv’(c1) has an ambiguous sign. The first term is negative, reflecting the higher forgone
income associated with migration cost  a  for large families due to the concavity of v(c0). The second term
is positive, reflecting the higher returns to migration for larger families. In the neighborhood of a maximum
the first two cross-partial derivatives must dominate, which is key to the result.
11 The positive effect of altruism on fertility generalizes to some but not all models that allow
investment in both quality and quantity of children. If we think of child quality as capital per capita then the
Ramsey growth model with endogenous fertility is a generalization. In some versions of that model fertility
increases in altruism (e.g. Becker and Barro (1988); Barro and Becker (1989)) while in others the effect is
ambiguous (Razin and Sadka (1995)).
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   2v’(c0) = ’(n+2)w1 rv’(c1)
That is, the cost of a child in foregone utility equals the discounted benefit, and investment in
migration is equal to its discounted return. 
Now consider heterogeneity in altruism.
9  In the neighborhood of the maximum (assuming
an interior solution), second order conditions can be shown  to yield
10
The result is intuitive: immigrants self select on altruism and altruistic couples prefer more
children, implying positive selection of immigrants in fertility. Thus heterogeneity in altruism and
self-selection together will generate a positive correlation between fertility and the decision to
migrate.
The prediction that immigrants have higher fertility comes with some caveats. First, not all
immigrants are self-selected. In particular, with low enough migration costs or high enough
returns everyone will choose to migrate, regardless of ’. Second, in a more general model that
allows for other forms of saving or for investment in child quality that positive correlation can be
dampened or reversed, depending on the returns to investments in quality, quantity and
migration.
11  Our intention is not to argue that immigrants should always have higher fertility than
natives, but rather to point out that self-selection on altruism links migration and fertility
decisions. That link motivates our empirical analysis.7
III. The Institution: High and Low Cost Waves of East Block Migration
Changes in emigration policy in the Soviet Union allow us to compare immigrants to Israel
in high and low migration cost regimes. In that sense they provide a “natural experiment” (i.e., a
plausibly exogenous source of variation) to study how migration costs affect self-selection on
fertility. Figure 2 illustrates the time series of immigration to Israel from the (former) Soviet
Union from 1960 through 1996. This is voluntary migration. It occurred in spurts, responding to
changes in the home country policy toward migration on the one hand and to changes in the
perceived risk of staying on the other. Over time Israel became a more attractive destination, as
per capita income surpassed that in the Soviet Union and her security stabilized.  Exit permits
began to be granted in significant numbers in the early 1970s, though at high cost. From 1982 till
1989 the flow of immigrants shifted to the U.S.,  which temporarily expanded its definition of
refugee status. In 1989 the CIS conducted a major policy shift, removing restrictions and allowing
free migration of Jews to Israel, while the U.S. reduced access.
It is important to stress that migration from the East Block up till 1989 was a fairly
expensive venture: Property was often confiscated; An applicant’s right to work was often
suspended; Heavy fees were imposed;  and the status of relatives in the communist party may
have been compromised. In contrast, migration to Israel since 1989 has been much easier, both
because of reduced restrictions in the countries of origin and because of surprisingly rapid
economic assimilation of immigrants in Israel.
Data
The Israel Labor Force Survey (LFS) randomly samples approximately 22,000 households per
year,  surveying household members aged 15 and older to generate about 100,000 annual
observations. We pool LFS incoming cohorts from 1974 through 1996 to generate 32,308
observations of Eastern European immigrants for analysis. Our measure of fertility is the number
of children currently at home, which is available in the LFS by grouped age category.
IV.  Migration and Selection: Evidence from East Block Migration to Israel
Conceptually, we are interested in two separate effects on the fertility of immigrants. The
first is the “treatment” effect of spending time in the destination country. The second is the effect
of self-selection of people with high planned fertility into immigration. Self-selection will be
stronger the higher the cost of migration since when the net return to migration is low only the
very altruistic will choose to migrate. 
In this section we use two different methods to separately identify treatment and self-
selection. The first involves using an early arrival cohort who arrived too old to have children in
Israel to identify the selection effect, (and identifying the treatment effect as the complement). The
second method estimates the treatment effect as a function of time in Israel and fertile years in
Israel (and identifying the selection effect as the complement).8
To illustrate our first identification strategy, consider a concrete example with birth
cohorts 1940 and 1950 and arrival cohorts 1980 and 1990. The 1980 arrival cohort faces high
costs while the 1990 cohort faces low costs, so the model predicts altruism for the early arrivals.
Some women born in 1950 immigrate early, at age 30, in 1980. The rest arrive late, at age 40, in
1990. The difference in their observed fertility at age 40, in 1990 is 
(1) f  early, young - f late, young . 
That difference can include both a treatment effect of ten years residence in Israel during their
fertile thirties and a selection effect due to differing costs of migration.
Now consider the older, 1940, cohort who migrated in the same two periods, some at age
40 in 1980 and others at age 50 in 1990. These women could not have experienced a treatment
effect, as they were essentially past their fertility window in 1980 before arriving in Israel.
Differences in the fertility of these two groups would be due only to selection and can be
measured by 
(2) f early, old - f late, old .
Now assuming that the selection effect is the same for the young and old cohorts, we can
identify the treatment effect by “differences in differences” as (1) - (2). 
Unfortunately, the data don’t quite allow this method, as the late, old group (arrived in
1990, born in 1940) are not observed till arrival at age 50, by which time we have a very poor
measure of their fertility, since most of the children have left home. Fortunately, Russian fertility
during this period is apparently stable across birth cohorts. Note that if the fertility of late arrivals
were the same for young and old 
(3) f late, young = f late, old , 
we could identify both treatment and selection effects. We offer some evidence below to support
that assumption, showing that fertility rates were stable for these cohorts in Russia.
Restated as an estimating equation, 
(4)   f  =  ￿ + ￿ early + ￿ young + ￿ early young + ￿, 
Cov(early, ￿) = Cov(young, ￿) = Cov(early young, ￿) = 0 . 
Here ￿ is the effect of selection. The parameter ￿ is the treatment effect of spending a
fertile period in Israel (that is, the effect that would have been observed had early migration been
randomly assigned among eventual immigrants). Both can be identified if the birth cohort effect,
￿, is assumed to be zero, as in (3).
To achieve precision we define early and late arrivals and young and old women more
broadly than in this example. Early arrivals immigrate by 1982. Late arrivals immigrate between
1989 and 1996. We ignore the few immigrants in the 1983-88 period to avoid the possible
confounding effects of selection between the U.S. and Israel as destinations. Young women are
born in 1948-52. Old are born in 1938-42. 12 In 1974-79 the “own children” is unavailable. We use instead a predicted value based on a
measure of all children in the household of the same ages. That prediction can be done with R-squared
values above .9 in the 1980-96 data, which includes both “own children” and “all children” measures.
13 Details of this calculation are available from the authors upon request.
14 Over the entire period since 1955 two-thirds of immigrants from Eastern Europe have come from
the Soviet Union, another 23% from Romania and 8% from Poland. Early migrants from other countries
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A. Measuring fertility
The LFS allows us to draw large samples of immigrants from different cohorts, but unfortunately
it does not ask how many children a woman has had in her lifetime. The survey does ask how
many children a woman has currently at home between the ages of 0 and 17, with subcategories
for 0-1, 2-4, 5-9, 10-14 and 15-17 (10-13 and 14-17 before 1987).
12 Children aged 18 and older
are not reported as they are usually in the military. The age of persons aged 18-24 is suppressed.
To estimate lifetime fertility we use the distribution of children aged 0-17 currently at
home. Let f(a) be the number of children (so far), where  a  is mother’s age. Let g(a) be the
number of children aged 0-17, which we can measure. Assume that the youngest age of mothers
at first birth is 16 (there are only a few at age 15 in the sample), so that children begin to outgrow
our measurement when the mother is 34. So
f(a) = g(a)  if a < 34
f(a) = g(a) + g(a-18)  if a ￿ 34
We approximate g(a-18) by using information from the closest birth cohort available for women
aged 34 and over, calculate its mean and add it to the reported number of children aged 0-17 to
predict f(a).
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Figure 3 illustrates this procedure, graphing  the means of observed number of children 
and the predicted number of children f(a) for East Block immigrants aged 25 and older.  While
f(a) should increase monotonically, it actually decreases sometimes. This is mostly due to
difficulty distributing children to ages within age brackets. Fertility levels off at around age 38 at
97% of its eventual level. The slight drop after age 40 reflects a weakness in the procedure, which
may be due to a small cohort effect in fertility or simply to measurement error. We exploit that flat
portion of the distribution and use the predicted number of children at ages 38-47 as a measure of
lifetime fertility.
B. Results
Table 1 compares descriptive statistics for early and late arrivals from the former Soviet Union,
both young and old. Women in the “young” group were born, on average, in 1950. The average
early arrival was in 1977-78, while the average late arrival was in 1990. In this table we have
restricted attention to arrivals from the former Soviet Union to allow comparability with the “late”
migration, which is 98% Soviet.
14are much less likely to be self-selected because migration costs were not always as high. In fact, most Jews
had emigrated from Poland and Romania by the 1980s. 
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The table allows direct calculation of our restricted differences in differences estimator.
The difference in predicted children between early, young immigrants and late, young is 
(2.49-1.71) = 0.78 . 
This large 0.78 difference in fertility between arrival cohorts potentially includes both treatment
and selection effects.
Assuming no cohort effect on fertility in the Soviet Union for these birth cohorts (equation (3)),
we can isolate the selection effect by comparing the fertility of old, early arrivals (assuming that
they arrived old to have a treatment effect) to that of young, late arrivals: 
(2.45-1.71) = 0.74 . 
This is a very large selection effect. Almost the entire 0.78 child difference in fertility by arrival
cohort is due to self-selection. The difference between these two yields an estimated treatment
effect of 
(0.78-0.74) = 0.04, 
which is quite small.
The selection effect, on the other hand, is quite large. A 0.7 child difference exceeds the
difference between the TFR of U.S. Canada and Australia (at about 2) and the Western European
average (of about 1.5). For societies with total fertility rates in the neighborhood of the
replacement rate of two, that selection effect is enough to make the difference between stable and
rapidly shrinking population in the long run.
Are there other observable differences between arrival cohorts in Table 1 that could
account for differences in fertility? (Note that in comparing cohorts the usual “natural” experiment
practice of arguing that the treatment and comparison groups should have similar observable
characteristics does not apply.  The estimated selection effect could not have occurred under
random assignment of early migration by definition.) Earlier arrival cohorts are more likely to be
(self-classified as) Jewish, more likely to be married, less educated (by about 1.5 years for the
later birth years) and slightly more likely to be Ultra-Orthodox. All of these differences are
associated with higher fertility for the earlier arrival cohort, but are unlikely to be the cause of the
gap in fertility. The differences are either too small to explain the large difference in fertility (in the
case of education, Ultra-Orthodoxy or Jewish) or more likely to be reflections of higher
preference for children (more currently married and fewer years of education).
Table 2 reports the same analysis in the regression format of equation (4), reporting
standard errors. For post 1960 arrivals the selection effect of 0.74 children is estimated with a
standard error of 0.12, which is enough precision to dramatically reject the hypothesis of no
selection. Allowing for earlier arrival cohorts (dating back to 1955) has no effect on this estimate.
The estimated treatment effect is positive but statistically zero in both samples.15 Calculated from the reported fertility of synthetic cohorts at five year intervals reported in
Vishevsky (1996) (Table 1.13 and Figure 1.1).
16 Stable fertility rates for this cohort contrast with the rapid decline in Russian fertility from 2.22
in 1987 to 1.39 in 1994 (Vishnevsky, 1996). That decline is due to reduced fertility of younger women.
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These estimates rely on the assumption that there was no cohort effect in Soviet Jewish
fertility for 38-47 year olds between the pre-82 and post-88 periods (i.e., that ￿=0 in equation
(4)). To investigate that assumption we examine cohort-specific fertility for urban Russians. We
think of them as a proxy for Soviet Jews, who were mostly urban and highly assimilated. Table 3
reports observed fertility for urban Russians in both 1982 and 1992.  Reported is the number of
children born so far for cohorts aged 35-39 and 40-44.
15 Reading across rows reveals that fertility
was stable for these cohorts from the late 70s to early 90s at 1.9 to 2.0 children per woman.
16 The
fertility rate of urban Russians in 1992 is similar to that of Jews of the same age immigrating from
the CIS in 1989-96. We read this as evidence supporting the assumption that there was no cohort
specific decline in fertility in the 1980s for Soviet Jews.
Overall, this method provides strong evidence of large selection effects in fertility by
arrival cohorts of immigrants. High cost immigrants have between 0.78 and 0.85 more children in
this sample and most of that effect is due to self-selection.
C. Predicting Children at Home: An Alternative Approach
An alternative to predicting eventual fertility using current children at home is to measure fertility
using children at home directly, estimate the effect of selection on children at home and interpret
the results in terms of lifetime fertility. This method allows us to use observations of younger
women that will add precision, free us of assumptions about cohort effects and allow us to
introduce geographic controls.  
Figure 4 illustrates the difference in fertility between early and late arrival cohorts from all
East Block countries, by age, pooling observations across 23 years of data. Early arrivals have
more children at almost all ages. Averaged across ages, this gap is 0.376 children at home.
To interpret that gap and the results that follow we require a way to convert observed
children at home into lifetime fertility. We use the identity
k(a) = p(a) x l , 
where k(a) is the count of children at home at mother’s age a, p(a) is the sample probability that a
given child will be at home and  l is lifetime fertility. Summing over all ages, 17 Author’s calculation based on LFS 1974-1996.
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where d is the average duration of residence at home for children. So, summing the identity over
ages and dividing by duration, lifetime fertility is 
We observe k in most sample years only for women aged 25 and older, but know that
92.6% of the stock of children-years at home is spent with mothers aged 25 to 60.
17 Assuming
that children spend all 18 years at home, (of which we observe 92.6%) over the 36 years between
25 and 60 (inclusive) we can convert the average number of children at home into an estimate of
lifetime fertility as,
 
So a 0.376 child gap in k (which represents an average across ages) translates into a gap
of  0.376*2.16 = .81 lifetime children. This figure is reassuringly close to the estimated difference
in predicted lifetime children between early and late arrival cohorts (0.86) reported in Table 2 for
immigrants from the former Soviet Union only.
Using the “children at home” measure allows us to exploit data from mothers at all ages,
greatly increasing precision. It also allows controls for birth cohorts and country (or even
republic) of birth, freeing us of the identifying assumptions above. To separate the gap in children
at home into treatment and selection effects we adopt an alternative to the simple old/young
classification above. Treatment effects are posited to be a monotonic function of years since
migration and of fertile years since migration,
￿ = ￿ (y,f) .
Years since migration (y) capture the effects of assimilation of local culture, increased lifetime
income and access to higher wages through accumulation of local human capital, such as
language. Fertile, or childbearing, years since migration (f) are measured as the number of years
between ages 17 and 42 spent in Israel. (At these ages the birth rate exceeds 1% for the early
arrival cohort). It should capture the (treatment) effect of local prices, wages and other
environmental conditions on childbearing decisions during the years at which a woman is most at
risk of having children. It seems plausible that these effects will be monotonic.
The stock of children at home is then estimated as 
(5) k = g(a) + ￿ (y,f) + ￿ early + X￿ + ￿ . 18 Note that this sample overstates the population share of early arrivals as they are at repeated risk
of sampling in the LFS in each year of residence in Israel.
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The first term represents the effect of age on fertility and the exit rate of children at age 18 (or
possibly earlier). The second term is the treatment effect of residence in Israel. ￿ measures the
effect of early migration on children at home, conditional on treatment, which we interpret as the
effect of selection on altruism, or ’. X is a matrix of demographic characteristics: decade of birth
and country of origin. All these can be identified using repeated cross-sections assuming no year
(of observation) effects, which is plausible since we count a stock of children generally born in
other years.
Table 4 reports descriptive statistics for the data available for this exercise. Columns
labeled “full sample” describe a sample of 32,308 observations from the LFS, of which 81%
arrived in the early (high cost) period.
18 Six percent of immigrants are sampled in the year of
arrival or in the following year. The population of immigrants displays considerable variance in
age and in country of origin. Fully 46% of arrivals are from the former Soviet Union, 17% from
Poland and 28% from Romania. Birth cohorts date back to the 1910s, but some are as recent as
the 1970s. Since birth cohorts and country of origin could predict fertility and be correlated with
arrival time, it will be important to control for these variables in estimation.
Table 5 contains the results of estimating equation (5). The left four columns reports the
coefficient on the “early” arrival indicator for the high migration cost era (arrival by 1982) which
reflects both treatment and selection effects. Age effects on “children at home” are estimated
nonparametrically using a full set of age indicators for g(a). The age-adjusted arrival cohort effect,
reported in the leftmost column of results, is 0.376 children at home, which translates to a fertility
difference between early and late arrivals of (2.16*.376 = ) 0.81 lifetime births. The following
column adds an indicator for arrival in the year of observation or in the previous year, in order to
estimate the “impact” effect of transition on fertility. The literature has reported a propensity of
immigrants to delay childbirth till after they settle in the new country (Blau, 1992). If ignored, that
transition effect could potentially bias our estimates, as late arrivals are disproportionately
sampled soon after arrival. Estimated transition effects are generally negative, as expected, but
small. Their inclusion has little effect on the estimated early arrival effect, reducing it slightly to
0.367.
Successively adding country indicators and birth decade indicators increases the estimated
gap between early and late arrival cohorts to 0.410 and 0.490 children at home, respectively. The
age-adjusted estimate (0.81 lifetime births) using women of all ages is quite close to the simpler
estimate in Table 2 of combined treatment and selection effects (0.78) based only on women aged
38 or more.  Adjusting for country of origin and birth cohort only increases the estimated fertility
advantage of early arrivals, as they tend to come from low fertility countries and low fertility birth
cohorts. Thus the age, country and birth-cohort controlled estimate of the early-late arrival gap in
fertility is (0.490 x 2.16 = )1.06 lifetime children, which is quite large. 
The right three columns report the decomposition of the fertility gap between early and
late arrivals into selection and treatment effects, using years since migration, y, and childbearing14
years since migration, f, to represent treatment. Years since migration has a large and concave
effect, accounting for a third of the difference in fertility by itself (column 4), leaving an estimated
selection effect of 0.327 children at home. Childbearing years since migration turn out to have a
tiny effect (column 5). The results are unchanged by adding quartic terms. The Table provides
clear evidence of both large selection and treatment effects, both significantly different from zero.
Selection is about twice as important as treatment, even controlling for country of origin. In terms
of lifetime children, these results can be interpreted as (0.323 x 2.16 =) 0.70 children due to
selection and 0.36 children due to treatment.
The former Soviet Union included a large number of disparate republics, including south-
central Asian republics that tend to high fertility and European republics with lower fertility.  The
1995 and 1996 LFS identify 13 republics of origin, allowing us to control for potential biases due
to a shift of migration from high to low fertility republics over time.  Table 6 reports estimates of
equation (5) using only the 1995 and 1996 data for the USSR and Poland, though including all
survey years for other countries. (A full list of republics is included in the note to Table 6.)
Summary statistics for these data are reported in the right panel of Table 4.
The first four columns of Table 6 report adjusted coefficients on “early” for the subsample
of data with information on Soviet republics. Once adjusted for age, transition effects of early
arrival, place of origin and birth cohort, the coefficient on early arrival rises to 0.503 children at
home, or 1.09 lifetime births, slightly more than in the larger sample. In this subsample estimated
treatment effects are larger, as indicated by the relatively small estimated selection effects.
Interpreted in terms of lifetime children, the 1.09 child gap between early and late arrivals is the
sum of a (0.202 x 2.16 = ) 0.44 child self-selection effect and a 0.65 child treatment effect of
residence in Israel. The difference in the effects of years since migration between the two samples
seems to be due to the exclusion of early Soviet immigrants (for whom we lack information on
republics) rather than to omitted variable bias in republics of origin. It may be that either
treatment or selection work somewhat differently for more recent Soviet immigrants than for
previous cohorts. 
To summarize the results from both methods of estimation, Tables 2, 5 and 6 consistently
reveal large, statistically significant self-selection effects, ranging from 0.4 to 0.8 children, a
finding robust to changes in sample and specification. While the two methods disagree on the size
of the treatment effect, we are more convinced by those in Tables 5 and 6 as they allow a much
richer set of controls. If the early/late gap could be properly adjusted for age and origin controls
the (noisy) estimates of treatment effects in Table 2 may not be statistically smaller than those in
Tables 5 and 6. We conclude that the age and origin-adjusted fertility gap between high and low
migration cost arrival cohorts is extremely large, probably more than a child, of which about half
is due to selection and about half to treatment. This large selection effect supports the hypothesis
that immigrants self-select on altruism.
In considering the evidence from both methods, it is worth bearing in mind that many
women who arrived young came as children whose parents made the migration decision. To the
extent that these children were less altruistic than their parents (perhaps because of regression to
the mean) the estimates offered above underestimate the true immigrant self-selection effect on19  Questions included cover demographics, financial and housing status, employment and
retirement plans, health insurance, life insurance and relationship with siblings. For details about the HRS
see http://www.umich.edu/~hrswww/overview.
20 The categorical nature of the inheritance variable suggests using limited dependent variable
analysis rather than linear regression. We chose report linear regression results as they are more easily
interpreted. The statistical content of the estimates in Tables 8 and 9 is essentially the same when ordered
probit equations are estimated instead.
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fertility. Alternatively, altruism (or other factors influencing fertility) could be fully heritable, in
which case the estimates reported above are accurate. We return to the implications of heritable
altruism in the conclusions.
V. Altruism of Immigrants: Bequests and Doting Grandmothers in the U.S.
We have shown so far that self-selection by immigrants has a fertility effect, as predicted
by the model, but have not provided any evidence that the mechanism is altruism. While no other
plausible mechanisms come to mind, we can further test our approach by examining its
implications for other indicators of intergenerational altruism. The U.S. Health and Retirement
Study (HRS) provides two such indicators: attitudes about bequests and time spent with
grandchildren. The 1992 wave interviewed a representative sample of 7,600 persons aged 51-61
in 1992, and spouses, (12,600 persons in all). It asked a set of questions designed to analyze
interrelationships between retirement, health, income and wealth.
19
Table 7 reports descriptive statistics for our two measures of altruism and a set of possible
predictors. The left panel reports means and standard deviations for the 6686 observations for
which observations on the full set of variables were available. Respondents were asked to choose
if leaving an inheritance was 1 - “not important,” 2- “somewhat important,” or 3- “very
important.” The mean is 1.96. 10% of respondents are immigrants, 49% are women and average
net worth is $210,000. The right panel reports on the 551 working grandmothers who reported
nonzero hours worked per week and answered all these questions. They averaged 832 annual
hours with their grandchildren and 7% were immigrants.
The left panel of Table 8 reports a linear regression of the bequest measure on potential
predictors. The first specification includes only the immigrant indicator and the religious
observance measure. Both coefficients are positive and significant. The coefficient on
“immigrant,” is statistically significant, at .175. To get an impression of the size of this effect,
immigrant status predicts more altruism (according to this noisy measure) than does a shift from
the lowest to the highest category of religious observance.
20 Including measures of wealth,
schooling and the wealth of children does little to change the coefficient on immigrant status. It is
also robust to including the number of children and grandchildren. Note that bequests are at best a
flawed indicator of altruism, as true altruists may make transfers in vivo. As such, the positive
coefficients reported are likely an underestimate the propensity of immigrants to make transfers to
their children.16
The HRS also asks individuals if they will leave a large inheritance. Answers are coded in
order of increasing inheritance from one to five. This is a problematic measure of intergenerational
altruism as it will be influenced by wealth and children’s anticipated wealth, which we do not fully
observe. The model suggests that immigrant families will have faster asset accumulation across
generations than others in both human and physical capital. Intergenerational consumption
smoothing in that case may imply pecuniary transfers from children to parents rather than
inheritance. Nevertheless, in the interests of full disclosure, the right panel of Table 8 reports
similar regressions predicting the answer to the inheritance question. For comparability, these
results are reported in the same format as those in the left panel. Though the coefficient on
immigrant is negative in the leftmost column of the right panel, it becomes less so when net worth
is included and becomes positive when a measure of children’s wealth is included. Nowhere is it
statistically significant. 
Table 9 reports on our favorite measure of altruism, the hours a grandmother spends with
her grandchildren. The leftmost column reports that immigrant grandmothers average 203 more
annual hours with grandchildren than native grandmothers. That estimate is robust to 
conditioning on hours worked. Adding age, marital status and especially “years since migration”
increases that estimate to 759 hours a year more with grandchildren, which is reduced by 18 hours
in each year since migration. The years since migration coefficient is important, as a possible
alternative explanation for immigrant grandmothers spending time with grandchildren is that they
tend to live with their children in the first years after arrival. An 18-hour reduction per year since
migration implies that only after 40 years since arrival would the new immigrant living
arrangement effect wear off, which is implausibly long. Accounting for net worth and
grandchildren increases the estimate to 1160 hours per year (in the first year), while adding
schooling, children and especially children’s wealth, reduces the estimate to 963 hours per year.
Schooling has a negative coefficient, perhaps reflecting higher shadow value of time. Children’s
wealth also has a negative coefficient, suggesting specialization within the family in child care.
Overall the Table indicates that no matter what controls are used, immigrant grandmothers spend
much more time with their grandchildren than do native grandmothers. Estimates in the first, third
and fourth columns are significantly positive at the 5% level.
We are at a loss to think of an explanation other than selection on altruism to explain these
patterns. The evidence in Tables 8 and 9 cannot be interpreted as irrefutable proof that immigrants
are disproportionately altruistic since we cannot rule out the possibility that some key variable has
been omitted. Yet most reasonable candidates have been included, though, so these results are
highly suggestive. They are consistent with images of immigrant parents saving for their children
and of immigrant mothers moving into college dormitories to cook and clean at exam time.
An important shortcoming of these data is that not all immigrants are self-selected. If the
net present value of migration is high enough, even people with high discount rates will invest in
migration. That may be the case for migration of refugees or migration under the reunification of
families criteria, for example. That would allow inclusion of the high discount (low altruism)
individuals that will tend to mute evidence of self-selection on altruism in the aggregate.17
VI. Interpretation and Conclusion
We have argued that intergenerational concerns are key to migration decisions and that
heterogeneity in intergenerational altruism induces self-selection of immigrants on fertility, since
both fertility and immigration are affected by altruism. Our estimates report large positive
selection effects. These effects are large enough to explain the average half-child per woman
difference in total fertility between the shrinking populations of Western Europe and the stable
(non immigrant) populations of U.S., Australia and Canada. The selection on altruism model is
also supported by evidence that immigrants to the U.S. are more likely than natives to value
inheritance and are also more likely to spend time with their grandchildren.
The literature on immigrant fertility has stressed the fact that immigrants assimilate the
local fertility pattern (Blau, 1992; Ford, 1990). Considering that Eastern European immigrants
arrived with a very secular background, a fertility increase from 1.7 children to the 2.0 child
fertility levels of secular Jewish Israelis would be predicted by the assimilation model. This is
roughly consistent with our estimated treatment effects. Self-selection implies overshooting (in the
Chiswick (1978) sense) by the early, young immigrants, assuming that Jews from Eastern Europe
and the CIS have the same distribution of altruism. Compared with secular Israeli Jews we see
strong evidence of overshooting, with the combined assimilation and self-selection effects giving
the early, young immigrants a fertility rate of 2.5.
If self-selection on altruism and intergenerational concerns are truly central to migration
decisions then how can we explain the lack of overshooting reported in the rest of this literature?
A possible explanation is that for immigrants to the U.S. countervailing effects are at play. First,
there is evidence of positive selection on predictors of low fertility such as wealth and education
(Blau, 1992). Second, the transition also involves a large increase in women’s wages. Jewish
immigrants from the former East Block are for the most part not selected on education or wealth
and experience a smaller transition in wage levels. Once those effects are muted, selection on
altruism may become the dominant phenomenon. That insight may become a key factor in
understanding the fertility choices of the current generation of high income residents of the
developed world. 
Self-selection of immigrants on intergenerational altruism provides an alternative
explanation for Chiswick’s classic finding that earnings of immigrants rise over time to eventually
overtake the earnings of natives (Chiswick, 1978). That is a straightforward prediction of the Ben
Porath human capital investment model (Ben Porath, 1967) where investment is increasing in
patience. Selection on altruism is also consistent with Borjas (1987), which finds a positive
correlation between the eventual income of individuals in the United States and average income in
the country of origin (conditional on measured skills). The lower the net return to migration the
greater the altruism (low discount rate) required to justify migration. The cohort of Soviets who
immigrated to the US during the high cost period of the 1980s also assimilated economically quite
successfully (Chiswick 1993b). Conditions of migration matter that foster selection, as in the Roy
model, may matter as much as country of origin.
Heterogeneity in intergenerational altruism has three important implications if this altruism
is heritable in families or ethnic groups.  First, since natural selection favors intergenerationally21 In the steady state of a Ramsey growth model with exogenous fertility, per capita income
increases in intergenerational altruism if the interest rate is decreasing in per capita capital.  With
endogenous fertility the countervailing influences of altruism on capital accumulation and population
growth make the result ambiguous. See, for example, Barro-Becker (1989) and Becker-Barro (1988).
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altruistic dynasties, their growing proportion in the population will increase aggregate fertility.
Thus populations with total fertility rates currently below two need not eventually disappear as
long as they contain a sufficiently altruistic subpopulation. The patient dynasties may increase
their population share, increasing the aggregate total fertility rate and eventually inheriting the
developed world.
A second implication of altruistic dynasties is that countries who received voluntary
immigrants over the last century may have higher average levels of altruism and thus higher long
term fertility rates, holding income constant. This observation is consistent with the large gap
between the total fertility rates of Australia, Canada and the United States (1.9, 1.9 and 2.1
respectively) and the OECD average (about 1.6).
Finally, in the Ramsey growth model a high level of intergenerational altruism implies
greater GDP on the steady state growth path both through larger population and through greater
investment. It may also imply greater income per capita in the steady state and faster convergence
to steady state levels of per capita income.
21 That should also be true of countries who received
voluntary immigrants over the last century. This observation is consistent with income levels
above the OECD average for Australia, Canada and especially the United States. Thus Solow
convergence in per capita income may be limited by differences in the distribution of altruism
(patience) in national populations. Selective migration implies that the distribution of altruism is in
turn due to historic differences in per capita income. A small historical advantage in per-capita
income could thus be amplified by self-selected altruistic immigrants to yield a permanent gap in
income and in population growth rates.19
Appendix: Comparative Statics for Section II
The Effects of Altruism on Fertility and Migration
Substituting constraints into the utility function, couples choose (n,m) to solve 
First order conditions are: 
Second order conditions are: 
To solve the comparative static effects of changing ’, we use the following simplifying result.20
Now applying Cramer’s rule yields positive effects of altruism on both n and m in the
neighborhood of a maximum.
These are the results reported in Section II.21
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Figure 1: Fertility and Income, 1992












Figure 2: Adult  Immigrants from Eastern Europe: 1945-96
Source: Israel Labor Force Survey, 1996.
Note: The Figure represents the distribution of arrival years for immigrants aged 25 and over in 1996.
Eastern Europe refers to the former USSR, Poland, Romania, the former Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Albania
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Figure 3: Estimated Fertility Using Children at Home
Source: Israel Labor Force Survey 1974-1996, author’s calculations.
Note: Children at home are aged 0-17. “Children” is estimated for mothers aged 33 and older by adding their
observed children at home to an estimate of unobserved children based on observed children at home for
younger mothers. See Section III.A for details.26
Figure 4: Children of High and Low Cost Arrival Cohorts from Eastern Europe
Source: Israel Labor Force Survey: 1974-1996
Note: Children at home are aged 0-17, so they underestimate lifetime fertility. “Early” (high cost) cohorts
arrive by 1982. “Late” (low cost) cohorts arrive beginning in 1989. Eastern Europe refers to the former
USSR, Poland, Romania, the former Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Albania and the former Czechoslovakia.27
Table 1: Characteristics of Late and Early Arrivals
Women aged 38-47 born in former Soviet Union, observed in Israel
Variable Arrived 1989-96 Arrived 1960-82 Arrived 1960-82
  (aged 38 or more
on arrival)
(aged 35 or more 
on arrival)
(aged 20 or less 
on arrival)
Year of Birth 1949.6 1939.9 1951.6
(0.08) (0.15) (0.28)
Children at home    
aged 0-17 0.91 1.43 1.74
(0.03) (0.13) (0.10)
aged 10-17 0.65 0.53 1.18
(0.02) (0.07) (0.07)
Predicted children  1.71 2.45 2.49
 (all ages) (0.02) (0.12) (0.09)






Jewish 0.93 1 0.995
(0.08) (0) (0.005)
Currently Married 0.77 0.80 0.86
(0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
Years of Education  14.3 12.2 12.8
(0.09) (0.33) (0.23)
Ultra-Orthodox 0.002 0* 0.02
(0.002) (0) (0.01)
Observations 939 148 186
Source: Israel Labor Force Survey micro data 1974-96. Sample includes immigrant women from the former U.S.S.R..
Weighted with sampling weights.
 * based on 132 observations28
Table 2: Treatment and Selection Effects on Fertility
Post 1989 Soviet immigrants compared with pre 1982 immigrants
Left hand variable: Predicted number of children 
explanatory variables 1960+ all years
selection: 











 (aged ￿20 on arrival)
constant 1.71 1.71
(0.02) (0.02)
Root MSE 0.90 0.93
R-squared 0.11 0.16
Observations 1273 1739
Source: See Table 1 for a description of the sample.
Note: Estimating equation (4) is described in text. Identification requires assuming that the main effect of
being a member of the “young” birth cohort is zero, following the discussion of equation (3) in text.
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses. All specifications weighted using sampling
weights.
Table 3: Observed Fertility of Urban Russians 
Children per woman through reported age
year















Authors’ calculation of observed fertility for synthetic cohorts. Based on age-specific fertility rates reported at
five year intervals, beginning at ages 15-19 in Vishnevsky (1996), Figure 1.1.  For example,1982 figure for
35-39 year-olds calculated by adding age specific fertility rates recorded in 1962, 1967, 1972, 1977 and 1982.29
Table 4: Summary Statistics for Predicting Children at Home






Children aged 0-17 
at home
0.91 1.15 0.81 1.11
arrived early (by 1982) 0.81 0.39 0.82 0.38
arrived this year or last 0.06 0.25 0.03 0.17
y (Years since migration) 20.8 14.1 24.3 13.4
y
2 630 648 773 650
y
3 21793 29632 27161 30530
f (Childbearing years  9.3 6.7 10.9 6.5
since migration: 17-42)
f
2 132 124 161 123
f
3 2048 2153 2534 2179
Birth decade:
1910s 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.20
1920s 0.22 0.41 0.24 0.43
1930s 0.24 0.43 0.25 0.44
1940s 0.26 0.44 0.24 0.43
1950s 0.17 0.38 0.14 0.35
1960s 0.08 0.26 0.07 0.26
1970s 0.003 0.056 0.005 0.071
Country of Origin:
USSR 0.46 0.50 0.23 0.42
Poland 0.17 0.38 0.25 0.43
Romania 0.28 0.45 0.40 0.49
Yugoslavia 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.11
Bulgaria 0.05 0.21 0.07 0.25
Albania 0.00003 0.006 - -
Czechoslovakia 0.03 0.17 0.04 0.21
Observations 32308 23129
Source: Israel Labor Force Survey 1974-1996. Children at home are “own children” aged 0-17, living at home, for women aged 25-
42. In 1974-79 “own children” is not reported, but children in household is reported instead. For that period “own children” is
predicted using the coefficient estimated from regression of “own children” on household children in the later period (a=-0.008,
b=0.98, R2 = 0.96.) Weighted using sampling weights. The LFS has a - 2 quarter in, 2 quarter out, 2 quarter in - rotation group
structure. The “full sample” includes all households once, resulting in an oversampling of the initial survey year, 1974, and draws
incoming rotations for 1975-1996. The sample with republic information has the same structure but includes only survey years
1995 and 1996 for immigrants from USSR, and oversamples 1995 (when republic information is available) while not sampling
survey year 1994 and the fourth quarter of 1993 to include households only once.30
Table 5: Treatment and Selection Effects on Children at Home
Left hand variable: Children aged 0-17 living at home 
explanatory variables “arrived early” reflects both
treatment and self-selection
“arrived early” reflects 
only self-selection
arrived early 0.376 0.367 0.410 0.490 0.327 0.331 0.323
 (by 1982) (0.014) (0.016) (0.018) (0.021) (0.026) (0.026) (0.028)
y (Years since migration) 0.018 0.030 0.020
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
y





f (Childbearing years  -0.031 -0.136







Arrived this year -0.031 -0.036 -0.016 0.043 0.037 -0.055
 or last (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.028)
age indicators (36) 8888 8 8 8
country indicators (6) 8 8 888
birth decade indicators (6) 8 888
R-squared 0.472 0.472 0.473 0.476 0.478 0.480 0.483
Observations 32308 32308 32308 32308 32308 32308 32308
Source: Israel Labor Force Survey 1974-1996. Includes all observations in 1974 and incoming rotations in
other years. 
Note: The left hand variable is “own children” aged 0-17, living at home, for women aged 25-42. Multiply by
2.16 to convert to lifetime fertility (as explained in Section IV). In 1974-79 “own children” is not reported, but
children in household is reported instead. For that period we predict “own children” using the coefficient
estimated from regression of “own children” on household children in the later period (a=-0.008, b=0.98, R
2 =
0.96.) The seven birth decades are 1910s through 1970s. The seven country groups are USSR, Poland,
Romania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Albania, Czechoslovakia.
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses. All specifications weighted using sampling
weights.31
Table 6: Treatment and Selection Effects on Children at Home
Including Republic Effects
  Left hand variable: Children aged 0-17 living at home 
explanatory variables “arrived early” reflects both treatment
and self-selection
“arrived early” reflects 
only self-selection
arrived early 0.342 0.336 0.511 0.503 0.264 0.247 0.202
 (by 1982) (0.018) (0.018) (0.038) (0.038) (0.045) (0.046) (0.047)
y (Years since migration) 0.021 0.040 0.039
(0.002) (0.003) (0.006)
y





f (Childbearing years  -0.041 -0.158







Arrived this year -0.043 -0.038 -0.037 0.047 0.052 -0.036
 or last (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.045) (0.045) (0.049)
age indicators (36) 8888 8 8 8
country and republic 88 8 8 8
 indicators (19)
birth decade indicators (6) 88 8 8
R-squared 0.488 0.488 0.493 0.497 0.499 0.502 0.505
Observations 23129 23129 23129   23129  23129 23129 23129
Source: Israel Labor Force Survey 1974-1996. See note to Table 4 for a description of sample. 
Note: The left hand variable is “own children” aged 0-17, living at home, for women aged 25-42. In 1974-79
“own children” is not reported, but children in household is reported instead. For that period “own children” is
predicted using the coefficient estimated from regression of “own children” on household children in the later
period (a = -0.008, b = 0.98, R
2  = 0.96.) The seven birth decades are 1910s through 1970s. The six country
groups are USSR, Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia. The 13 republics are Lithuania,
Latvia, Estonia, Belorussia, Ukraine, Russia, Moldavia, Azherbaijan, Kazhakastan, Turkimenistan,
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kirgistan.
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses. All specifications weighted using sampling
weights.32
Table 7: Immigrants and Indicators of Altruism:  Descriptive Statistics















Immigrant 0.10 0.29 0.07 0.25
Age 56.1 4.9 54.6 4.1
Female 0.49 0.50
Currently married 0.65 0.48 0.57 0.50
Years since migration
 (immigrants only)
25.2 11.9 26.2 12.1
Religious observance
3 2.9 1.4 3.0 1.3
Net Worth ($1000s) 210 483 139 301




12.5 3.8 12.4 2.9
Children 1.8 2.3 3.6 1.9
Children with annual
income  above $30,000 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4
Weekly work hours 37.2 11.2
Observations 6686 551
Source: U.S. Health and Retirement Survey, 1992 wave.
Notes:
1 “Inheritance important” is coded as 1- “not important,” 2 - “somewhat important” or 3 - “very
important.”
2 “Will leave large inheritance” coded from 1 to 5 in increasing inheritance. 6709 observations.
 
3 Religious observance is an index with values ranging from 1 to 5 in ascending order of observance. 
4 Years of schooling completed is recorded for years 0-16, with postgraduate study recorded as 20.33
Table 8: Predictors of Altruism: Inheritance





(Scale from 1 to 3)
Will leave “sizeable” Inheritance
(Scale from 1 to 5)
Immigrant 0.175 0.182 0.148 -0.176 -0.104 0.040
(0.071) (0.071) (0.071) (0.116) (0.110) (0.109)
Religious
observance
0.035 0.035 0.035 0.063 0.064 0.063






























Constant 2.01 2.01 2.01 2.55 2.53 2.11
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.20) (0.20) (0.21)
Root mean sq. error 0.73 0.73 0.73 1.36 1.32 1.31
R-squared 0.009 0.013 0.013 0.028 0.091 0.101
Observations 6686 6686 6686 6903 6903 6903
Source: U.S. Health and Retirement Survey, 1992 wave. See Table 7 for descriptive statistics. All
specifications include age, years since migration and indicators of marital status and gender.34
Table 9: Predictors of Altruism: Time with Grandchildren








Immigrant 203 237 759 1160 963
(99) (155) (376) (565) (565)
Weekly hours -3.91 -5.52 -2.35 -1.07
(2.74) (2.82) (3.90) (3.96)
Age -12.9 -26.9 -14.9
(7.2) (12.2) (12.6)





































Constant 866 914 1727 2290 2277
(26) (107) (429) (687) (732)
Root mean sq.
error
1121 1041 1017 1050 1037
R-squared 0.003 0.005 0.015 0.033 0.060
Observations 2046 1034 978 551 551
Source: HRS, 1992. See Table 7 for descriptive statistics.